Operational Decisions What is the Nature of the Information Required?

This monograph analyzes two historical campaigns and current doctrine to determine what information is required of the operational commander to make decisions. It looks at the nature of the information used by the operational commander in the formulation of his campaign plan. The monograph also presents conclusions based on the analysis and implications for current doctrine. The operational commander is required to link battlefield success to strategic goals. The commander must base his decisions on both current tactical information and on strategic information concerning his opponent. The missing link in the information chain is what information is needed by the operational commander to make informed decisions. FM 100-5, Operations, has reintroduced the U.S. Army to the concept of operational art. The practice of the operational art requires the commander to make critical decisions in time and space that is different from the tactical commander. The foundation for these decisions requires information that is different from the information requirement of the tactical commander. The campaigns of General U.S. Grant in 1864 and General William Slim in 1944 in Burma are used as the vehicles to demonstrate the unique nature of the information required by operational commanders. FM 100-5, Operations, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare, and FM 100-16, Echelons Above Corps are reviewed to determine to what extent current doctrine recognizes the information requirement for operational commanders. A comparison of the analysis of the historical campaigns with a review of current doctrine reveals shortcomings in current doctrine regarding the information requirement for operational commanders.