Being Realistic About Reasons
Afbeeldingen
Sla de afbeeldingen overArtikel vergelijken
Uitgever: Oxford University Press
Auteur:
T Scanlon
- Engels
- Hardcover
- 9780199678488
- 16 januari 2014
- 132 pagina's
Samenvatting
Is what we have reason to do a matter of fact? If so, what kind of truth is involved, how can we know it, and how do reasons motivate and explain action? In this concise and lucid book T. M. Scanlon offers answers, with a qualified defense of normative cognitivism--the view that there are normative truths about reasons for action.
T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism--the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.
T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism--the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.
Productspecificaties
Wij vonden geen specificaties voor jouw zoekopdracht '{SEARCH}'.
Inhoud
- Taal
- en
- Bindwijze
- Hardcover
- Oorspronkelijke releasedatum
- 16 januari 2014
- Aantal pagina's
- 132
- Illustraties
- Nee
Betrokkenen
- Hoofdauteur
- T Scanlon
- Hoofduitgeverij
- Oxford University Press
Overige kenmerken
- Extra groot lettertype
- Nee
- Product breedte
- 141 mm
- Product hoogte
- 15 mm
- Product lengte
- 223 mm
- Studieboek
- Ja
- Verpakking breedte
- 145 mm
- Verpakking hoogte
- 15 mm
- Verpakking lengte
- 224 mm
- Verpakkingsgewicht
- 290 g
EAN
- EAN
- 9780199678488
Je vindt dit artikel in
- Categorieën
- Taal
- Engels
- Beschikbaarheid
- Leverbaar
- Boek, ebook of luisterboek?
- Boek
- Studieboek of algemeen
- Algemene boeken
Kies gewenste uitvoering
Kies je bindwijze
(2)
Prijsinformatie en bestellen
De prijs van dit product is 52 euro en 99 cent.
Uiterlijk 6 juni in huis
Verkoop door bol
- Prijs inclusief verzendkosten, verstuurd door bol
- Ophalen bij een bol afhaalpunt mogelijk
- 30 dagen bedenktijd en gratis retourneren
- Dag en nacht klantenservice
Rapporteer dit artikel
Je wilt melding doen van illegale inhoud over dit artikel:
- Ik wil melding doen als klant
- Ik wil melding doen als autoriteit of trusted flagger
- Ik wil melding doen als partner
- Ik wil melding doen als merkhouder
Geen klant, autoriteit, trusted flagger, merkhouder of partner? Gebruik dan onderstaande link om melding te doen.