Corporate Governance, Competition, and Political Parties Explaining Corporate Governance Change in Europe
Afbeeldingen
Sla de afbeeldingen overArtikel vergelijken
Uitgever: Oxford University Press
Auteur:
Roger M. Barker
- Engels
- Hardcover
- 9780199576814
- 21 januari 2010
- 327 pagina's
Samenvatting
Over the last decade, significant changes in corporate governance in Continental Europe have been increasingly evident. This book argues that firms in some of these countries have eschewed the traditional stakeholder-orientation for a strategy based on the maximization of shareholder value, despite a period of social democratic politics in Europe.
The corporate governance systems of continental Europe have traditionally been quite different to those of the liberal market economies (e.g. the US and the UK). Company ownership has been dominated by incumbent blockholders, with a relatively minor role for minority shareholders and institutional investors. Business strategy has focused on the achievement of social stability - taking into account the interests of a broad group stakeholders - rather than the maximisation of shareholder value. However, since the mid-1990s, European corporations have adopted many of the characteristics of the Anglo-American shareholder model. Furthermore, such an increased shareholder-orientation has coincided with a significant role for the Left in European government. This presents a puzzle, as conventional wisdom does not usually conceive of the Left as an enthusiastic proponent of pro-shareholder capitalism. This book provides an analysis of this paradox by examining how economic factors have interacted with the policy preferences of political parties to cause a significant change in the European system of corporate governance. This book argues that the post-war support of the European Left for the prevailing blockholder-dominated corporate system depended on the willingness of blockholders to share economic rents with employees, both through higher wages and greater employment stability. However, during the 1990s, product markets became more competitive in many European countries. The sharing of rents between social actors became increasingly difficult to sustain. In such an environment, the Left relinquished its traditional social partnership with blockholders and embraced many aspects of the shareholder model. This explanation is supported through a panel data econometric analysis of 15 non-liberal market economies. Subsequent case study chapters examine the political economy of recent corporate governance change in Germany and Italy.
The corporate governance systems of continental Europe have traditionally been quite different to those of the liberal market economies (e.g. the US and the UK). Company ownership has been dominated by incumbent blockholders, with a relatively minor role for minority shareholders and institutional investors. Business strategy has focused on the achievement of social stability - taking into account the interests of a broad group stakeholders - rather than the maximisation of shareholder value. However, since the mid-1990s, European corporations have adopted many of the characteristics of the Anglo-American shareholder model. Furthermore, such an increased shareholder-orientation has coincided with a significant role for the Left in European government. This presents a puzzle, as conventional wisdom does not usually conceive of the Left as an enthusiastic proponent of pro-shareholder capitalism. This book provides an analysis of this paradox by examining how economic factors have interacted with the policy preferences of political parties to cause a significant change in the European system of corporate governance. This book argues that the post-war support of the European Left for the prevailing blockholder-dominated corporate system depended on the willingness of blockholders to share economic rents with employees, both through higher wages and greater employment stability. However, during the 1990s, product markets became more competitive in many European countries. The sharing of rents between social actors became increasingly difficult to sustain. In such an environment, the Left relinquished its traditional social partnership with blockholders and embraced many aspects of the shareholder model. This explanation is supported through a panel data econometric analysis of 15 non-liberal market economies. Subsequent case study chapters examine the political economy of recent corporate governance change in Germany and Italy.
Productspecificaties
Wij vonden geen specificaties voor jouw zoekopdracht '{SEARCH}'.
Inhoud
- Taal
- en
- Bindwijze
- Hardcover
- Oorspronkelijke releasedatum
- 21 januari 2010
- Aantal pagina's
- 327
- Illustraties
- Nee
Betrokkenen
- Hoofdauteur
- Roger M. Barker
- Hoofduitgeverij
- Oxford University Press
Overige kenmerken
- Extra groot lettertype
- Nee
- Product breedte
- 162 mm
- Product hoogte
- 24 mm
- Product lengte
- 240 mm
- Studieboek
- Ja
- Verpakking breedte
- 162 mm
- Verpakking hoogte
- 242 mm
- Verpakking lengte
- 240 mm
- Verpakkingsgewicht
- 652 g
EAN
- EAN
- 9780199576814
Je vindt dit artikel in
- Categorieën
- Taal
- Engels
- Boek, ebook of luisterboek?
- Boek
- Beschikbaarheid
- Leverbaar
- Studieboek of algemeen
- Algemene boeken
Kies gewenste uitvoering
Kies je bindwijze
(2)
Prijsinformatie en bestellen
De prijs van dit product is 25 euro en 34 cent. Dit is een tweedehands product.Alleen tweedehands
Goed
Uiterlijk 14 juni in huis
Verkoop door
Bogamo 12 - Boeken outlet
- Bestellen en betalen via bol
- Prijs inclusief verzendkosten, verstuurd door Bogamo 12 - Boeken outlet
- 30 dagen bedenktijd en gratis retourneren
Shop dit artikel
Rapporteer dit artikel
Je wilt melding doen van illegale inhoud over dit artikel:
- Ik wil melding doen als klant
- Ik wil melding doen als autoriteit of trusted flagger
- Ik wil melding doen als partner
- Ik wil melding doen als merkhouder
Geen klant, autoriteit, trusted flagger, merkhouder of partner? Gebruik dan onderstaande link om melding te doen.