Operation Dragoon: Unified Land Operations and Elements of Operational Art in Southern France - Vital World War II Western Front Battle, One of Least Celebrated and Highly Successful Allied Assaults Ebook Tooltip Ebooks kunnen worden gelezen op uw computer en op daarvoor geschikte e-readers.

This report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Operation Dragoon, the invasion of Southern France on August 15, 1944, is one of the least celebrated, yet highly successful operations conducted by the Allies on the Western front during World War II. Allied planners initially proposed an amphibious invasion of Southern France in support of the cross-channel invasion during the Trident Conference in Washington, DC in May 1943. Allied planners revisited Operation Dragoon several times over the next twelve months, as it remained a divisive issue between the Americans and the British. Their divergent strategic goals and the limited resources to meet these goals resulted in frequent changes and cancellations, but ultimately the operation went forward. Operation Dragoon was a supporting operation to the Allies' main effort in Normandy. The operation had two primary purposes: to force the German forces in France to fight in two directions and to give Allied forces access to the vital port facilities at Marseilles and Toulon. Operation Dragoon achieved far more success than anticipated. The Germans failed to anticipate the landings and form a viable defense, leaving them with only the option to withdraw. As the Germans began to retreat, American and French forces began an aggressive pursuit. In less than four weeks they caused the Germans to sustain a loss of over 150,000 casualties while liberating a large portion of Southern France. This monograph seeks to provide insight into various elements of today's concept of operational art and the US Army's operational doctrine expressed in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations (ULO). By identifying and analyzing similar methods employed in making Operation Dragoon a success, this monograph identifies ways in which the success of the operation can inform future operational planners.

Contents: 1. The Road to Operation Dragoon 2. Analysis of Operational Art in Operation Dragoon 3. Conclusion

Operation Dragoon achieved far more success than the British and Americans anticipated. The Germans failed to predict the landings and form a viable defense, leaving them with withdrawal as the only option. As the Germans retreated, American and French forces aggressively pursued. In less than four weeks they inflicted more than 150,000 German casualties while liberating a large portion of Southern France. Combat of this scale exceeds the experience of today's US Army officer, who typically has experienced limited warfare such as counterinsurgency and stability operations. Also, American wars since the Vietnam War have not involved casualties anywhere close to the scale of a WWII campaign. It is hard for today's Army officers to imagine large-scale offensive operations against another major power.

In addition to Operation Dragoon's extraordinary success, it also offers insights for those in the profession of arms on topics ranging from global strategy to joint combined operations. Analyzing Operation Dragoon reveals similarities between the principles that guided the planning and execution used and the modern US Army's doctrine of Unified Land Operations (ULO) and concept of operational art. Thus, historical study yields a greater understanding of today's concept of operational art and the US Army's operational doctrine by identifying and analyzing similar methods employed during Operation Dragoon. The elements of operational art and tenets of ULO highlighted in this case study analysis show the reader the importance of each principle. Historical analysis of Operation Dragoon offers useful insights into modern US Army operational art doctrine with relevance for current and future operational planners.